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This volume includes papers and research proposals prepared 
by researchers under the aegis of the University of 
Zimbabwe/Michigan State University (UZ/MSU) Food Security 
Research Programme in Southern Africa. The objectives of 
the UZ/MSU research programme are spelled out in Chapter 
One by Mandivamba Rukuni and Carl K. Eicher.
The papers in this volume (with the exception of Chapters 
Three and Five) are revised versions of papers that were 
presented at the University of Zimbabwe's Second Annual 
Conference on Food Security Research in Southern Africa, 
Holiday Inn, Harare, November 9-13, 1986.
But before we go further, lets step back and examine the 
context for food security research in Southern Africa. 
Currently, 70 million people live in the nine SADCC 
countries in Southern Africa. Since SADCC states are 
closely linked to the global food economy through capital 
transfers, exchange rate movements, food aid and trade, it 
is important to examine recent trends in the global food 
economy and the results of research over the past decade on 
the causes of food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition.
In the decade since the global food crisis of the early 
1970s, four important lessons have been learned about the 
global food equation. First, the projected doomsday
scenario of food shortages and higher real food prices in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s has not materialized. 
Instead, the global food models developed during and 
following 1972/73 world food crisis did not accurately 
foresee a world food economy of the 1980s with world maize 
prices at a twenty-five year low. In sum, the food 




A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE FAO REPORT ON SADCC
AGRICULTURE
Carl K. Eicher and Fidelis' Mangwiro
"The principal danger in macro-economic 
exercises lies in their propensity to dazzle"
- W. Arthur Lewis, 1966.
INTRODUCTION
The Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organiza­
tion of the United Nations (FAO) proposed to SADCC in 
September, 1983, that the FAO undertake an analysis of 
SADCC's long-term food supply and demand prospects to year 
2000. SADCC's acceptance of the offer was followed by the 
appointment of a Rome-based task force to carry out the 
study; the FAO team completed its report in six months and 
it was published as SADCC Agriculture: Toward 2000 (FAO, 
1984 ).
The objective of SADCC Agriculture was to provide a 
framework by which planners can assess available resources 
and consider two alternative courses of action (strategies) 
"to promote SADCC's goals of greater food security and 
self-reliance" (p xiii). The report advanced twenty-three 
policy recommendations for implementation at both national 
and regional levels in order to accelerate agricultural 
development in the region. The focus of the FAO report is 
on measures to increase the level of food self sufficiency 
while assuming that people in the SADCC region will have 
the ability (land, income or jobs) to acquire a calorie- 
adequate diet.
* This chapter is a revised version of a larger background 
paper that was prepared for a SADCC Meeting of Permanent 
Secretaries, Chief Economists, Food and Agriculture 
Sector Coordinators and Ministers of Agriculture, Harare, 
July 24-26, 1986 (See Eicher and Mangwiro (1986).
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The purpose of this chapter is to present an independent 
assessment of the FAO report and draws some soberinq 
lessons for external task forces and visiting "experts" 
preparing reports on SADCC agriculture.
METHODOLOGY
The FAO team preparing the report for SADCC drew heavily on 
the methodology and data generated in the preparation of 
Agriculture: Toward 2000 (FAO, 1981). The Rome-based FAO 
team developed three computer scenarios for SADCC 
agriculture from 1979-81 to year 2000. The team first 
examined the agricultural performance of SADCC countries 
from 1966-81 (adjusted for external shocks such as weather 
and wars). The team then used these historical data (e.g. 
average crop yields) in developing a computer scenario to 
trace the consequences of pursuing present food and
agricultural policies during the 1980s and 1990s to year 
2000. This is described as the trend (T) scenario. But
the projections for the T scenario were gloomy. Under this 
scenario, population growth rates were projected to be 
twice as high as food production growth rates in year 2000.
For example, the annual increase in demand for food
arising from income and population growth was estimated to 
be 3.5 percent compared with 1.5 percent growth in 
agricultural production.
The trend (T) scenario was used as a benchmark to compare 
two alternative food and agricultural strategies: an Improv­
ed Performance (IP) and a High Performance (HP) food and 
agriculture strategy to year 2000. The FAO team used its 
computers in Rome to develop conditional projections'^ of 
expected outputs of SADCC agriculture for each of the
1/ The FAO team took pains to point out that they did not 
have the time, data and funds to make "forecasts" of 
what is likely to happen but instead presented 
conditional projections of "what could happen given 
certain policy assumptions" (p. xv).
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three strategies for 1990, 1995 and 2000. The improved
performance strategy (IP) for year 2000 assumes that the 
nine governments in the SADCC region would each step up 
public expenditure on agriculture, assumes agricultural 
researchers would be more product ive^ and assumes that 
the agricultural production would more than double, from 
1.4 to 3.2 percent per year. However, under the improved
performance (IP) strategy, the 3.2 percent annual growth in 
agricultural production would still be less than the 4.0 
percent assumed annual increase in the demand for
agricultural products over the 1984-2000 period.
The high performance (HP) strategy assumes that SADCC
governments would give even higher priority to agriculture 
than in the IP strategy, and assumes that even higher 
crop yields would be forthcoming. The results of the 
computer runs on the HP strategy were favourable and 
regional food self-sufficiency was projected to be achieved 
in all food categories by 2000, except for livestock. 
However, it was assumed that higher agricultural exports 
would finance livestock imports into the region.
In light of the weak data base in the region, it is a
puzzle why the team relied so heavily on developing 
computer scenarios of SADCC agriculture?
AN ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
While one can take issue with the FAO on dozens of details
of SADCC Agriculture, space permits us to mention only
1/ This is a heroic assumption because of the serendipi­
tous nature of research. Moreover, it takes a decade, 
on average, for plant breeders to develop, farmer test 
and release a new variety. But there are many "dry 
holes" in research and in some countries it takes sever­
al decades of research to develop new technology. For 
example, it took 28 years of research (1932 to 1960) to 
develop the famous SR 52 hybrid maize variety for com­
mercial farmers in Zimbabwe (Eicher, 1984).
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nine general reservations about the accuracy and usefulness 
of the report:
1. Production Estimates
The starting point in a study of the potential of 
increasing food and agriculture production in the nine 
countries in the SADCC region is to examine the micro data 
base with emphasis on crop yields, output and livestock 
off-take rates on a crop by crop and country by country 
basis. The FAO team approached this task by examining 27 
commodities and constructing commodity balances (demand, 
production and trade) for each commodity for a base year 
(the three year average for 1979-81) and two future points: 
1990 and 2000. The team then developed production
projections on the basis of estimates by unidentified 
"authorities" on likely feasible yields for each of the 27 
crops, cropping intensity, and the allocation of land to 
crops for six land-water classes in the SADCC region. 
Similar estimates were made for herd growth, off-take rates 
and carcass weights for cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs 
and poultry. Crop and livestock production estimates were 
then generated by the computer for the three scenarios and 
checked with projections of demand for food and other 
commodities at various years along the way to 2000.
The FAO experts glossed over the stark reality that the 
data base on crop and livestock production is extremely 
weak. The FAO task force should have been candid on this 
issue and attached a bibliography of data sources (with 
reservations and adjustments), including names of the
unidentified "authorities" who provided their views on 
likely crop yields in 1990, 1995 and 2000^.
1/ The FAO report does not include a bibliography 
standard feature of a scientific report.
a
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There are two standard data sets on world agriculture - FAO 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). But 
production estimates from these two institutions can vary 
by a factor of 50 to 350 percent in a given country. For 
example, Uma Lele and Wilfred Candler of the World Bank 
report that for 1973-74, the USDA estimate of sorghum and 
millet production in Tanzania was 3.5 times higher than 
that of the Ministry of Agriculture while the FAO estimate 
was 88 percent of the Ministry's (Lele and Candler, 1984, 
p.211). Moreover, Lele and Candler contend that:
data on domestic agriculture in most African 
countries are too unreliable to ascertain the 
level of production in any given year. Further, 
year-to-year production fluctuations in reported 
statistics are often too large to estimate a trend 
with any degree of confidence. Judgements about 
deviations from a trend by amounts as small as 
five or ten percentage points would be nearly 
impossible (Lele and Candle, 1984, p 211).
If there are uncertainties about data quality in Tanzania 
two decades after independence, what about the quality of 
data on agriculture in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe? In 
Zimbabwe, there are around 4,200 commercial farmers and 
800,000 communal (smallholder) farmers. The data base on 
commercial farmers is probably the best in Africa byt the 
data base on communal farmers is extremely weak. For 
example, the Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural 
Industry of Zimbabwe reported after a year of fact-finding 
that:
It. is salutary to observe that Zimbabwe, in spite 
of its proud record of agicultural research, has 
an almost total absence of detailed data on 
conditions in the communal lands. This country 
urgently requires a comprehensive data base on 
socio-economic conditions in the communal lands 
both to guide agricultural policy and to ensure 
that resources devoted to agriculture are put to 
their best use. Without such data the improvement 
of productivity in communal areas will remain at 
best a "hit or miss affair" (Chavanduka, 1982. 
p. 9).
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In summary, the data base on crop and livestock production 
in the SADCC region is so unreliable that it raises serious 
questions about shoveling "official" data into computers 
and generating conditional projections for 1990, 1995 and
2000. The failure to alert readers to the unreliable data 
base of the computer senarios is disturbing - especially 
given the fact that the FAO is the official UN 
organization charged with collecting and maintaining 
historical data on world agriculture.
2. Demand Estimates
With population growing at 2.5 to 4.0 percent per year and 
per capita income growth projections of 0 to 2 percent per 
year, the annual increase in the demand for food will range 
from 2.5 to 5 or 6 percent per year in SADCC countries. 
However, the estimation of the demand for food five, ten 
and 15 years down the road is a complex and risky exercise. 
For example, there are almost no recent estimates of 
income elasticities for staple foods in the SADCC region. 
Although food consumption surveys were popular in Africa in 
the 1960's (Eicher and Baker, 1982), this area of research 
has been dormant in Africa for more than a decade^.
Several staple foods require special attention in demand 
studies, for example, since roughly two-thirds of the wheat 
consumed in the SADCC region in 1985 was imported, wheat 
dependency is a complex political economy issue that
requires careful analysis. The FAO report states that
"Zimbabwe is the only surplus producer of wheat" (FAO, 
1984, p.7.13) in the SADCC region when, in fact, Zimbabwe
has been importing wheat since 1982. For the FAO to report 
that Zimbabwe was a"surplus producer of wheat" in 1984 when
it imported wheat raises further questions about the
reliability and credibility of the FAO report. In 1986,
1/ For example, Paulino (1987) concentrates on supply 
projections because of the dearth of demand data.
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Zimbabwe imported about 15 percent of its domestic wheat 
requirements and restricted the demand for wheat through an 
informal rationing system of supplying only 20,000 tons a 
month to millers.
The importance of reliable demand estimates for the type of 
study that the FAO carried out for SADCC is stressed in a 
review of 10 studies of food balance projections that were 
initiated in the midst of the global food crisis of 
1973/74. Fox and Ruttan (1983) concluded that the failure
of the authors of the 10 studies to carefully examine the 
transitory demand - side factors of the global food market 
in the early 1970's led to an incomplete analysis and 
pessimistic global food projections for the 1980's.
4. Technology on the Shelf
We believe that the FAO report overestimates the stock of 
food crop technology on the shelf in the SADCC region. The 
FAO team asserts that "what is missing at both national and 
regional levels is an examination of why farmers have not 
accepted technologies" (p. 3.26). Presently, there is a
backlog of maize varieties on the shelf in the maize belt 
(Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi) in the SADCC region and red 
sorghum for brewing. But technology is not on the shelf in
most SADCC countries for the following food crops: white
sorghum, millet, summer wheat, rice and groundnut varieties 
for small farmers. We believe that the FAO should have 
given more attention to a country-by-country inventory of
present food crop technology and devoted more attention to
measures to strengthen national research services for the 
development of improved technological packages.
There are many mysteries about science, technology and 
African agriculture^. Why are some crops more robust in
1/ For an elaboration of some of these puzzles see Carl K. 
Eicher (1982) and "Western Science and African Hunger" 
(1986a).
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terms of international transfer? What explains the vast 
difference in the ability to move maize and wheat germplasm 
worldwide? For example, CIMMYT, the Mexican-based
international research center on wheat and maize, reports 
that 45 million hectares of wheat but only 4 million 
hectares of maize varieties carry CIMMYT germplasm in 
developing countries (CIMMYT, 1985). This is one of the 
many puzzles about technology transfer that requires more 
analysis. In summary, the FAO report devotes superficial 
attention to science, technology and SADCC agriculture.
4. Human Capital
The shortage of professional agricultural manpower is acute 
in the SADCC region. For example, in 1985, expatriates 
represented 26 percent of all professional staff in 
research, extension services, agricultural training schools 
and faculties of agriculture in the nine SADCC countries 
(Devres, 1985, p. 46). Moreover there is growing criticism 
of expatriates and technical assistance in SADCC policy 
circles^. For these reasons, one would expect that
human capital improvement in the region would be examined 
in depth but, unfortunately, SADCC Agriculture devotes 
only three pages to human capital (pp 6.8 to 6.11) The
report notes that "The main finding is that the principal 
requirement for greater food self-sufficiency is the 
effective mobilization of human resources rather than the 
development of physical resources" (p xix). The FAO report 
then advances the following banality for policy makers in 
the SADCC region: "manpower training is the most effective 
long-term approach to increasing absorptive capacity" (p. 
6 . 10).
1/ See Eicher (1986) for a discussion of technical 




Most agricultural development specialists, including 
agricultural economists are specialists in a commodity such 
as coffee or maize, or a problem area such as maize streak 
virus, nematodes, credit or marketing. As a result of
their specialised training, most agricultural development 
specialists display a singular lack of interest in the role 
of institutions - political, legal, social, technical, and 
cultural - in development. The FAO is no exception in this 
regard. The ignorance of the FAO team about SADCC
institutions surfaces throughout the report. If the FAO 
team had more time, they undoubtedly would have devoted 
more attention to examining how to strengthen the 
institutional base - research, training and extension - for 
smallholder agriculture in the SADC region.
6. Food Losses
The FAO report asserts that "pre and postharvest losses 
from pests and diseases currently reduce food availability 
by 30 to 40 percent or more" (FAO, 1984, p3.9). But the 
FAO does not provide evidence to support this assertion. 
In a recent review of the literature on postharvest losses 
in developing countries, a big gap was found between 
"guestimates" produced by short term missions and actual 
losses recorded by careful research studies. Greeley 
reports that:
eleven 'expert' guestimates on post-harvest losses 
of rice at farm level in Bangladesh were published 
between 1975 and 1980; their average was 26.8 
percent. By contrast, a three year research 
project which physically measured losses in all 
post-harvest operations from cutting to cooking 
showed that total post-harvest rice losses at farm 
level were below 7 percent (Greeley, 1986, pp 
340-41 ).
We are of the opinion that simple but thorough studies of
actual losses from pests, disease and on-farm storage are
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needed before donors decide to invest in programmes to 
reduce post-harvest losses in the region.
7. Agricultural Growth Rate Projections
Central to the FAO projection exercise is the assumption 
that 21 policy reforms will spur economic growth and 
increase agricultural growth rates. In fact, the high 
performance (HP) scenario assumes that the rate of
agricultural growth will be 4.8 percent per year over the 
1979-81 to 2000 period (page 2.11). But a word of caution 
is in order. Few countries in the Third World have been 
able to achieve and sustain annual rates of growth of agri­
cultural output of four percent for one or more decades. 
Reynolds (1986) recently compared the agricultural perform­
ance of forty-one countries for thirty years, 1952-1981. 
He found that none of the African countries achieved annual 
growth rates of agricultural output of 4 percent or more - 
for the entire period. Only one of the five high perform­
ance countries in Asia and Latin America, Thailand, 
achieved a growth rate above 4 percent in all four periods 
as shown in Table 1.
Table Is Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural Production 










South Korea 5.4 3.2 4.2 4.4
Thailand 4.5 5.1 5.1 4.8
Malaysia 3.0 5.6 4.8 4.4
Mexico 5.0 4.5 3.5 4.1
Venezuela 4.5 5.3 3.8 4.4
(Source: Reynolds 1986, pp.96-97)
In summary, most Third World countries have found it diffi­
cult to achieve and sustain annual food and agricultural 




A decade ago two World Bank economists - Reutlinger and 
Selowsky (1976) - pointed out the fallacy of estimating a 
country-wide average of daily per capita calorie intake 
without taking the distribution of income into account^. 
The FAO report on SADCC Agriculture estimates that the per 
capita calorie supply for the entire SADCC region will be 
2,117 in 1990 and 2,188 in 2000 (page 2.10). These heroic 
guestimates make no allowance for distribution of income 
and the capacity of various classes in society to produce, 
purchase or acquire food. In sum, the two pages devoted to 
food consumption and nutrition in the FAO report have 
little scientific validity.
9. Policy Reform
The report lists 23 specific policy measures needed to 
achieve the targets set for 2000 by the Improved
Performance (IP) scenarios. But instead of identifying 
specific policy measures, the report identifies general 
measures applicable to almost any country in Africa, Asia 
or Latin America. For example, policy measure No.16 on 
livestock improvement recommends that
Measures in this area are also highly dependent on 
progress in changing the social role of cattle and 
on attitudes to communal grazing land; they are 
further constrained by the lack of extension 
workers. However, possibilities for action do 
exist. For example, livestock owners can be 
brought together with local leaders to form 
livestock associations, or they may be organized 
through village committees to bring about 
agreements on the use of communal grazing and to 
improve contacts with extension services (p.3.28).
1/ For example, the authors found that in Brazil the aver­
age daily level of calorie consumption (2,566) was more 
than adequate based on estimates of average calories 
consumed on a national basis (i.e. dividing estimated 
national food production by estimated population. But 
an analysis of calorie consumption by income groups re­
vealed that 44 percent of the total population were cal­
orie deficient (Reutlinger and Selowsky, 1976, pp.10 -11).
58
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
The FAO study is an exercise in food pessimism and
represents another "False Start" for Africa. The FAO's 
projections are at wide variance with the current maize 
surplus in SADCC1s maize belt (Zimbabwe and Malawi) and the 
sorghum surplus in Zimbabwe. Whereas the FAO report 
identifies 23 policy reforms that should be undertaken by 
member states to increase crop and livestock production, 
favourable rainfall in 1985 and 1986 was obviously more 
important than policy reform in chanqing the short term 
food and agriculture situation in the region.
There are no quick fixes for African agriculture. This is 
the painful lesson that the Food and Agriculture Organiza­
tion of the United Nations should learn from its maiden pub­
lication for SADCC. The FAO report on SADCC Agriculture 
is the product of a team that did the best it could, given 
the shaky data base and the time allotted - six months - by 
FAO's top management in Rome to complete the report. The
team made a major methodological mistake by churning out 
computer scenarios when the underlying micro data base was 
so weak. Although these computer-based macro economic 
projection models "have a propensity to dazzle" as Nobel 
Laureate W. Arthur Lewis reminds us, they assume away the 
tough institutional, technical and political issues that 
govern hunger, poverty and access to food.
For donors interested in policy dialogue with SADCC states, 
there is no substitute for investing in strengthening 
policy research institutions in the SADCC region for the 
next 10 to 15 years. Since economic policy research is 
just as location-specific as maize breeding, it follows 
that visiting teams of "experts" and overseas-based task 
forces should be replaced by investments to strengthen 
economic policy research institutions on a country by 
country basis. Policy dialogue on food and agriculture 
requires a slow and progressive build-up of African
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capacity to address African problems. The biggest lesson 
that SADCC can learn from this assessment is to apply 
leverage on donors to help develop African research 
capacity to deal with the macroeconomics of food and 
agriculture in the region. What do visiting teams leave 
behind when they prepare a report for SADCC or a SADCC 
Member state?
It is interesting to note that SADCC's updated strategy for 
food, agriculture and natural resources that was approved 
by the nine SADCC Ministers of Agriculture in Mbabane, 
Swaziland on October 9, 1986 did not cite the 1984 FAO
report (SADCC, 1987). A summary of SADCC's updated 
strategy is presented in the next chapter of this book.
Is it not understandable why the FAO report is gathering 
dust in government offices throughout the SADCC region?
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